Europe. There is no more divisive issue in British politics and indeed British history. In recent decades, several senior politicians have tried to sideline the European question. None has succeeded, and that does not seem to be a likely outcome any time soon. We cannot seem to get away from the subject.
In one respect, that is hardly surprising, because several of the most important events in our history had European aspects. The first was geology. Over many millennia, tectonic plates shifted. Finally, around 8,000 years ago, they settled down, establishing the current boundaries of the English Channel. This should have insulated the British Isles from continental convulsions and to a great extent it did. But there were exceptions. In 43 AD, the Romans invaded England and brought a superior civilisation with them. Then their Empire declined and fell. England was abandoned to the Dark Ages.
Then came the last successful invasion of these Islands, in 1066. The Normans knew how to conquer and imposed their rule with great cruelty. But they also brought the fruits of civilisation, endowing the country with cathedrals and castles. The Norman conquest also ensured that England at least became part of Frankish Europe. The alternative might have been an extension of Southern Scandinavia.
There was one consequence of the post-1066 outcome. For the next 850 years, England was regularly embroiled in conflict with France. But almost all of the fighting took place in Europe, so England did not suffer too much destruction. Although the French eventually won the Hundred Years War, they were rarely on the winning side, except during the American War of Independence, when they helped to bring the USA into being, for better or for worse.
Otherwise, a French defeat in Italy had profound consequences, though no Englishmen realised it at the time. At the Battle of Pavia, Charles V of Spain beat Francis I of France. As a result, Charles controlled Rome. Henry VIII was growing fed up by the failure of his Queen Catherine of Aragon to produce an heir. He decided that he wanted a divorce. But Catherine was Charles's aunt. He came to her rescue.
This was one of the catalysts of the English Reformation and also of profound constitutional change. Around that time, go-ahead Monarchs were tending to dispense with their medieval assemblies. Although Henry VIII might well have done the same, he decided that he needed his Parliament to help him devise his new religious settlement. By the time Charles I did try to rule without Parliament, it was too late. The outcome was a lost war - and a lost head.
But for many centuries, the English could fight the French without really hating them. 'That sweet enemy, France' as Philip Sidney put it, and he spoke for many educated Englishmen.
Fast forward to the Nineteenth Century. After 1815, there was a new era in Anglo-French relations. We became allies. It is not clear whether it was really necessary to fight the Crimean War: a bloody business without great gains. Yet in 1914 and 1939, there was no alternative. We had to fight the Great War to prevent the Germans from dominating Europe. In 1939, a second round was required, to help to prevent Hitler from destroying civilisation. But by 1945, Britain was exhausted. On the edge of bankruptcy, we were also about to lose our Empire.
Throughout Europe, including Britain, many thoughtful men concluded that this must never happen again. Obviously, a new dispensation was required to ensure that France and Germany never again went to war over Alsace-Lorraine. But that was not enough. By then, Europe had looked into the abyss. In Nietzsche's words, if you stare into the abyss for long enough, it will stare back at you.
Throughout the continent, as their countries crawled away from the abyss's basilisk stare, a lot of young politicians came to a similar conclusion. In its earlier years, nationalism had been associated with self-determination, freedoms and democracy. By 1945 it had been marching in jackboots, a creed of oppression and mass murder: the harbinger of the abyss. Equally, the nation state had seemed to be a vehicle of progress. But on the continent of Europe, by 1945, with the almost irrelevant exception of Switzerland and Sweden, every nation state had either been attacked by its neighbours or had attacked them, or had suffered a coup. Nation states had no reason to trust their borders or their institutions.
All this was part of the political and indeed spiritual foundations of the European Union. It also explains why Britain has never been comfortable in that Union. We had repelled invaders. Our institutions had survived and most Brits, however much they might grumble about politics and politicians, more or less felt that the current system was just about trustworthy. As for Europe, most of them still thought of it as a continent separated by sea. 'Storms in the Channel: the continent cut off' as a newspaper headline once informed its readers.
So from then on, the EU and Britain were doomed to diverge. There was another factor in this: France. That sweet enemy may have fallen short of enmity but the sweetness was often lacking. General de Gaulle was a recurrent problem. In the first place, he had never forgiven the British for their role in D-Day. He could not bear the thought that the British had come to France as liberators, not as fellow captives. Moreover, he wanted to preserve the notion that France could claim to be a quasi superpower.
The route to this was Europe. De Gaulle saw Europe as a French jockey on a German horse. France would give the orders. The Germans would pay the bills and the rest could act as stable boys. The General knew that the British would never accept such a role so he was determined to keep us out.
There were always some British politicians who were determined to circumvent the General and find a way to join up. They knew that the more Europe appeared to be a supra-national state, determined to add to its powers at the expense of its constituent nations, the harder it would be to woo the British electorate. So the British Europhiles stressed the supposed economic benefits of joining and played down the political consequences.
They had one advantage; Britain's recurrent economic problems. From the late Fifties onwards, it seemed that the British were condemned to choose between growth and inflation. If ever the economy looked like growing, inflation kicked in. Sometimes indeed, both happened at once; stagflation.
This had the inevitable consequence of undermining Britain's economic self-confidence and indeed self-respect. It was during these gloomy moments that the UK joined the EU, and the electorate then endorsed that decision in a referendum.
So was this the end of one long era in British history? Not exactly. There was a woman called Margaret Thatcher, who had a visceral belief in British self-determination. She believed that if the British people could produce goods and services at a price and quality that would win customers, while governments ran sensible fiscal and monetary policies, and kept the trade unions within the rule of law, we would not need foreigners to tell us how to run our affairs. Under her stewardship, there was a resurgence in British self-confidence.
After 1975 and the 'yes' vote in the referendum, the Europhiles assumed that with every passing year, the British public would grow more used to Europe. At the beginning, immuno-suppressant drugs would be needed to ease the passage of this new organ in the body politic. That never happened. The drug doses had to stay high.
There were two principal reasons for this. First, Europe ought to guarantee free movement of goods and services. That was not a problem. But it also applied to free movement of people, and that caused a growing problem with public opinion.
The same was true of the European Court of Human Rights - not a part of the EU, but certainly part of the European syndrome. It often seemed more enthusiastic about protecting the so-called rights of illegal immigrants than those of ordinary citizens. Public dissatisfaction grew, especially in the Conservative party. David Cameron thought that he could deal with this and called another referendum. He narrowly lost.
Since then, British politics has been in turmoil. One might have assumed that under new leadership, the Conservatives would have settled down, sorted out any necessary arrangements with Europe and resumed normal service. It has not proved that simple. As part of the European-related convulsions, a new political movement has emerged: Reform, led by a cheery populist, Nigel Farage. As if that was not confusing enough, a chap called Rupert Lowe has led a breakaway from Reform.
While this has been going on, we have been condemned to a weak government with a huge Parliamentary majority, which seems unable to deploy the power which our electoral system could give it. The Prime Minister Keir Starmer and most of his senior colleagues would like to open negotiations with the EU, but there would be serious obstacles in the way. First, a lot of working-class Labour supporters do not think much of the EU and are vehemently opposed to immigration. Second, although many Europeans would be in favour of cooperating with the British on defence, most governments and especially the Sweet Enemy are very unlikely to give Britain acceptable terms. We would have to pay money and open our borders.
So Labour's many enthusiasts for Europe are generally keeping quiet, at least until the aftermath of an upcoming by-election. Everything is uncertain, except for one basic point. The European issue is not going away. It will continue to bedevil British politics for the foreseeable future.